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Abstract 
In this paper we lay down the agenda for a discipline that is meant to 
promote research on increasing the development of secure information 
systems. In particular, we introduce areas related to the development of 
secure information systems; we identify limitations of existing approaches 
and the barriers that currently limit research, and we discuss the 
characteristics for an engineering discipline for the development of secure 
information systems, its principles and the challenges that must be 
addressed.  
Keywords: information systems engineering, security engineering, secure 
information systems development, security requirements, integration of 
security and information systems engineering. 
1 Introduction 
We are living in a world where most of the information systems must be 
secure or they will not be used. Consider, for instance, the implications of 
a bank or a health care information system without provisions for security. 
It is therefore of paramount importance to fully understand the 
characteristics, principles and challenges that underlie the development of 
secure information systems. It is only then that we will be able to develop 
secure information systems. In gaining an in depth understanding of 
developing secure information systems, security should be considered, 
along with its related concepts such as trust and safety, within the whole 
context of information systems development and not in isolation. 
Moreover, various factors that might affect the security of an information 
system but are not limited to technical issues, such as for example the 
human factor, should be considered.  
In fact, securing information systems raises a set of intertwined issues in 
the areas of security engineering and information systems engineering. 
However, information systems engineering and security engineering 
research communities traditionally work independently. As a result of this 
situation, security is usually considered after the analysis, design and 
implementation of the system has been completed. Security mechanisms 
are enforced into the system without considering the overall design and 
this usually results in problematic systems and security vulnerabilities 
(Stallings, 1999; Anderson, 2001). 
We believe that the existence of secure information systems cannot be 
achieved just by employing formal models, methodologies and security 
mechanisms (although these are useful) during their development neither 
by ad-hoc approaches to solve the various problems involved in securing 
information systems. What is really needed is an engineering discipline 
which will form the basis to understand in depth the security issues 
involved in the development of information systems; provide the 
appropriate knowledge to assist information systems engineers and 
security engineers in developing secure information systems and also 
educate system users on issues related to the security of information 
systems. The main aim of this paper is to propose such an engineering 
discipline for secure information systems development, which we call 
Secure Information Systems Engineering. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
introduction on security of information systems and section 3 discusses the 
motivation for secure information systems engineering. Section 4 lays out 
the manifesto for secure information systems engineering and section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
2 Security of information systems 
Physical security systems have been around for many thousands of 
years, ranging from castle fencing, to window bars and door locks. 
Computer security, on the other hand, although newer in comparison with 
physical security is definitely not a new topic since its history starts in the 
1960s (Saltzer, 1975). Nevertheless, it was until the advent of distributed 
systems and computer networks that security of information systems has 
become an issue of huge concern.  
According to Anderson (2001), “security engineering is about building 
systems to remain dependable in the face of malice, error or mischance”. 
Therefore, security of computer based information systems is concerned 
with methods providing cost effective and operationally effective 
protection of information systems from undesirable events (Lane, 1985). 
Security is usually defined in terms of the existence of any of the 
following properties: 
• Confidentiality: The property of guaranteeing information is only 
accessible to authorised entities and inaccessible to others. 
• Authentication: The property of proving the identity of an entity. 
• Integrity: The property of assuring that the information remains 
unmodified from source entity to destination entity. 
• Access Control: The property of identifying the access rights an 
entity has over system resources. 
• Non repudiation: The property of confirming the involvement of 
an entity in certain communication. 
• Availability: The property of guaranteeing the accessibility and 
usability of information and resources to authorised entities. 
Failure of any of the above-mentioned security properties might lead to 
many dangers ranging from financial losses to sensitive personal 
information losses. The existence of the above security properties within a 
system is defined in terms of the security policy. A security policy can be 
defined as “the set of rules that state which actions are permitted and 
which actions are prohibited” (Gollmann, 2001). A security policy 
determines the limits of acceptable behaviour and what the response to 
violations should be; and it might define possible mechanisms, widely 
known as security mechanisms, designed to detect, prevent or recover 
from a security attack. A security attack is defined (Stallings, 1999) as an 
action that compromises the secure information owned by an organisation 
or an individual. 
It is well known that perfect security is very hard to achieve and usually 
the goal is to provide an acceptable security level, usually by trading 
security requirements with other functional and non-functional 
requirements of the system-to-be. Due to the attention that the issue of 
securing information systems has received the last few years and due to 
the large increase on the number of emerging defence mechanisms 
deriving from the ongoing research advances, someone would expect that 
system developers are able to develop and deploy very secure information 
systems. Nevertheless, current surveys indicate that we are far even from 
developing acceptable secure information systems (CERT, 2003; DTI, 
2004). 
One of the reasons is that, so far, security is mainly considered a 
technical challenge. However, it is has become apparent that a technical 
only approach in the development of secure information systems will not 
produce the expected results, since security is a multidimensional issue 
that cannot be considered in isolation. All information systems are 
ultimately embedded in some human social environment, and therefore the 
effectiveness of the system depends very much on the forces in that 
environment (Yu, 2006). Especially, with the advances on information 
systems and the transition towards open and autonomous systems, issues 
such as sociality, trust, privacy and delegation of responsibilities are 
closely related to the security of information systems. This argument is 
also supported by recent research, which has shown that the human factor 
has a significant impact on security. For example, one of the main threats 
to medical private records is social engineering. Social engineering is a 
non-technical kind of intrusion that relies on human interaction and 
involves tricking other people (doctors, or nurses in the case of medical 
records) to break normal security procedures. 
 
3 Motivation for secure information systems engineering 
There are various reasons that motivate the establishment of the secure 
information systems engineering discipline. In this section we identify and 
discuss the five most important of them, and we explain how these affect 
the development of secure information systems by presenting real-life 
scenarios.  
 
3.1 Independent solutions 
Securing information systems raises a set of intertwined issues in the 
areas of security engineering and information systems engineering. 
However, information systems engineering and security engineering 
research communities traditionally work independently. On one hand, 
information systems engineering techniques and methodologies do not 
consider security as an important issue, although they have integrated 
concepts such as reliability and performance, and they usually fail to 
provide precise enough semantics to support the analysis and design of 
security requirements and properties (Crook, 2003; Mouratidis, 2004). On 
the other hand, security engineering research has mainly produced formal 
and theoretical methods, which are difficult to understand by non security 
experts and which, apart from security, they only consider limited aspects 
of the system. 
 
3.2 Problems in current state of the art 
As indicated by current research (Mouratidis, 2006) information 
systems engineering methodologies do not create a security control 
environment early in the development process and modelling languages 
fail to include specialised handling of security requirements. However, 
there is a large number of works, which mostly have been developed the 
last few years.   
Initial work from the information systems engineering community 
produced a number of methods and processes for reasoning about non-
functional requirements, including security. Chung (1995) proposed the 
Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) framework to represent security 
requirements as potentially conflicting or harmonious goals and using 
them during the development of information systems. From the security 
engineering community, Schneier (2000) proposed attack trees as a useful 
way to identify and organise different attacks in an information system 
whereas Viega and McGraw (2001) proposed ten (10) principles for 
building secure software. More recently, Anton et al. (2004), proposed a 
set of general taxonomies for security and privacy, to be used as a general 
knowledge repository for a (security) goal refinement process. 
The pattern approach has been proposed by a number of researchers to 
assist security novices to act as security experts. Schumacher and Roedig 
(2001) proposed a set of patterns, called security patterns, which 
contribute to the overall process of secure information systems 
engineering. Fernandez (2006) specified security models as object 
oriented patterns that can be used as guidelines for the development of 
secure information systems.  
Although useful, these approaches lack the definition of a structured 
process for considering security. A well defined and structured process is 
of paramount importance when considering security during the 
development. 
On the other hand, a number of researchers model security by taking 
into account the behaviour of potential attackers. Van Lamsweerde and 
Letier (2000) use the concept of security goals and anti-goals. Anti goals 
represent malicious obstacles set up by attackers to threaten the security 
goals of a system. In addition, Van Lamsweerde (2004) defines also the 
notion of anti-models, models that capture attackers, their goals and 
capabilities. Similarly, Crook et al. (2003) introduce the notion of anti-
requirements to represent the requirements of malicious attackers. Anti-
requirements are expressed in terms of the problem domain phenomena 
and are satisfied when the security threats imposed by the attacker are 
realised in any one instance of the problem. Lin et al. (2003), incorporate 
anti-requirements into abuse frames. The purpose of abuse frames is to 
represent security threats and to facilitate the analysis of the conditions in 
the system in which a security violation occurs. An important limitation of 
all these approaches is that security is considered as a vague goal to be 
satisfied whereas a precise description and enumeration of specific 
security properties is still missing.  
Differently, another “school of thinking” indicates the development of 
methods to analyse and reason about security based on the relationships 
between actors (such as users, stakeholders and attackers) and the system. 
Liu et al. (2003) have presented work to identify security requirements, 
analysed as relationships amongst strategic actors, during the development 
of multiagent systems. Moreover, secure Tropos (Mouratidis, 2004) has 
been proposed to deal with the modelling and reasoning of security 
requirements and their transformation to design that satisfies them. Secure 
Tropos, is an extension of the Tropos methodology (Bresciani, 2004) and 
it is based on the concept of security constraint (Mouratidis, 2004; 
Mouratidis, 2005) to analyse the security requirements of an information 
system. To compliment the development process, security attack scenarios 
(Mouratidis, 2004b) and a security patterns language (Mouratidis, 2005c) 
have been developed. Giorgini at al. (2003) have introduced an 
enhancement of Tropos that is based on the clear separation of roles in a 
dependency relation between those offering a service (the merchant 
processing a credit card number), those requesting the service (the bank 
debiting the payment), and those owning the very same data (the 
cardholder). Moreover, Giorgini et al. (2004) have proposed a PKI / trust 
management requirements’ specification and analysis framework based on 
the clear separation of trust and delegation relationship.  
Although a relationship based analysis is suitable for reasoning about 
security, an important limitation of these approaches is that either they 
focus on some development stages more than others (such as the secure 
Tropos approach) or they only guide the way security can be handled 
within a certain stage of the information systems development process 
(such as the work by Liu et al. and Giorgini et al).  
Another direction of work is based on the extension of use cases and the 
Unified Modelling Language (UML). Initial work by McDermott and Fox 
(1999) adapt use cases, which are called abuse cases, to capture and 
analyse security requirements. An abuse case is defined as a specification 
of a type of complete interaction between a system and one or more actors, 
where the results of the interaction are harmful to the system, one of the 
actors, or one of the stakeholders of the system. Similarly, Sindre and 
Opdahl (2005) define the concept of misuse case, the inverse of use case, 
which describes a function that the system should not allow. They also 
define the concept of mis-actor as someone who intentionally or 
accidentally initiates a misuse case and whom the system should not 
support in doing so. Alexander (2003) adds Threatens, Mitigates, 
Aggravates links to the use case diagram. Jurgens proposes UMLsec 
(Jurjens, 2004), an extension of the Unified Modelling Language (UML), 
to include the modelling of security related features, such as 
confidentiality and access control. Lodderstedt et al. (2002) also extend 
UML to model security. In their approach security is considered by 
analysing security related misuse cases.   
An important limitation of all the use-case / UML related approaches, is 
that they do not support the modelling and analysis of security 
requirements at a social level but they treat security in system-oriented 
terms. In other words, they lack models that focus on high-level security 
requirements, meaning models that do not force the designer to 
immediately go down to security requirements. 
On the other hand, a large amount of work has been devoted to security 
policies and the definition of security models. Various models1 have been 
proposed based on mandatory access control (MAC), discretionary access 
control (DAC) and role base access control (RBCA). One of the first 
models was the Bell & Lapadula multilevel security model (Bell, 1976). 
                                                 
1 An extensive presentation and discussion of these models are out of the scope of this chapter and 
this book.  
Another well known model is the Chinese Wall model (Brewer, 1989), 
according to which data is organised into three different levels.  
 The definition of security ontology is also an important area of research 
within the security engineering community. Initial efforts to define a 
widely accepted security ontology resulted in what is known as the Orange 
Book (US Department of Defense Standard DOD 5200.58-STD). 
However, work towards this standard started in the late 1960s and it 
concluded in the late 1970s.  Therefore important issues, raised by the 
introduction of the Internet and the usage of information systems to almost 
every aspect of our lives, are missing from the standard. More recently 
Kagal et al (2005) have developed an ontology expressed in DAML+OIL 
to represent security information, trust and policies in multiagent systems, 
whereas Undercoffer and Pinkston (2002) after analysing over 4000 
computer vulnerabilities and the corresponding attack strategies employed 
to exploit  them have produced an ontology for specifying a model of 
computer attacks.  
Although important and useful in many situations, the above work has a 
number of important limitations with respect to the integration to 
information systems engineering practice. First of all, it mainly considers 
the later stages of the information systems development process. As 
argued before, it is important that security is considered from the early 
stages of the development process. Moreover, existing work is mainly 
focused on the technological aspects of security and it ignores, in general, 
the social dimension of security. It is important that security is considered 
within the social context and any social issues, such as trust and the 
involvement of humans, are taken into account (Mouratidis, 2006). 
 
3.3 Custom solutions  
   
 
   
In many cases the inclusion of security on a system is driven by existing 
custom solutions (security mechanisms) rather than the system’s real 
security requirements. Supporting the development of the security of the 
system on specific security mechanisms, as opposed to security 
requirements, prevents the consideration and choice of different and 
sometimes better solutions to satisfy the security requirements. For 
instance, imagine a system which requires identification and 
authentication. If the development of the system is based on some specific 
solutions to these requirements, such as username and password, then 
other solutions might be ignored, such as biometric identification and 
authentication, which in some cases could better fulfil the initial security 
requirements. Therefore, it is important that only the security requirements 
drive the development, as it happens with functional requirements, and not 
the well-known security solutions.  
 
3.4 Lack of sharing existing knowledge 
As indicated above, information systems and security engineering 
communities mainly work separately. This separation not only creates a 
void in the proposed solutions but it also results in restricted sharing of 
existing knowledge. Different research events organised by the two 
communities, different research publications and so on. Even widely used 
textbooks mostly concentrate in one part of the problem, either technical 
security issues or information systems engineering techniques, and they 
only contain, when they do, very limited information about the integration 
of the security and information systems engineering principles.   
 
3.5 Lack of appropriate education  
Professional training courses and university curriculum should help 
towards the solution of the above problem. However, they propagate it. 
   
 
   
Information systems and security engineering training as well as 
curriculum development in universities follows the separation of the two 
research areas. As a result, information systems engineering principles are 
taught separated from security engineering issues and vie versa. This 
means that information systems engineers are not well educated regarding 
the security issues that might face during the development of information 
systems, and security engineers mostly are not familiar with current 
practices and issues surrounding information systems engineering.  
 
3.6 Problematic Scenarios  
The above problems affect the development of secure information systems 
as demonstrated by the following real-life scenarios: 
• Requirements engineers do not usually receive appropriate training 
(Firesmith, 2003) in eliciting, analysing and specifying security 
requirements. As a result, they often confuse them with security 
mechanisms which are used to fulfil them. Therefore, they end up 
defining architectures and constraints rather than true security 
requirements (Firesmith,2003). 
• Information systems engineers are faced with the development of 
secure information systems according to their security 
requirements. However, not all information systems practitioners 
are security specialists neither they fully understand mathematical 
security models (McDermott, 1999). An information systems 
engineer without the appropriate security knowledge and without 
information systems engineering practices that integrate security as 
part of the development process more likely will fail to develop the 
system according to its (security) requirements.  
• Security engineers are often required to enhance the security of an 
existing system. However, current security models and 
methodologies used by security engineers do not fully analyse nor 
reason the implication that the addition of security components 
will have on the existing functionalities of the system. Without 
appropriate processes and methodologies to guide them, most 
likely they will fail.  
• Information systems engineers are required to test, during design, 
whether the system under development satisfies its security 
requirements. However, the lack of appropriate languages and 
automated techniques makes such task very difficult.  
It has been widely argued (Anderson, 2001; Van Lamsweerde, 2004; 
Mouratidis, 2006) within the computing research community that a careful 
integration of security issues within information systems engineering 
processes will provide a solution to the above technical problems and a 
step towards the development of information systems with less security 
vulnerabilities. In particular, Devanbu and Stubblebine (2000) state on 
their roadmap on information systems engineering for security “security 
concepts must inform every phase of software development, from 
requirements engineering to design, implementation, testing, and 
deployment”. Similarly Crook et al (2003) state “our vision is that we will 
be able to model these [security] concepts and integrate them into the 
requirements engineering process”. In line with these statements, 
Mouratidis et al (2005) argued that security should be considered from the 
early stages of the development process and security requirements should 
be defined alongside with the system’s requirements specification. Taking 
security into account alongside the functional requirements throughout the 
development stages helps to limit the cases of security/functional 
requirements conflict by avoiding them from the very beginning or by 
isolating them very early in the development process. To adequately 
consider security issues during the information systems development life 
cycle, security should be integrated within information systems 
engineering languages, methods, methodologies and processes. 
We agree with the above views but we believe that ad-hoc approaches will 
not adequately resolve all of the above problems. Most often, and as it is 
demonstrated by the current state of the art, ad-hoc approaches tend to 
focus only on the technical problems, for instance the development of 
languages, methodologies, models and so on. However, such approaches, 
although they provide right steps towards the solution of the most difficult 
problem, do not provide any solutions towards the other problems, such as 
the lack of appropriate education and sharing of information.  
To adequately resolve all the issues, we need a large scale effort, lead by 
the information systems and security engineering communities, to 
establish a discipline concerned with the development of secure 
information systems. The rest of the paper presents a manifesto of such a 
discipline, which we denote by the term secure information systems 
engineering.   
 
4 Secure information systems engineering: A Manifesto 
Although we provide a definition for secure information systems 
engineering, we do not consider it to be absolute, but rather we expect it to 
be revised from time to time to indicate the maturity and the advance of 
the discipline, as it is the case with most disciplines. We define Secure 
Information Systems Engineering as the engineering discipline concerned 
with the development of secure information systems. In particular, secure 
information systems engineering is concerned with the knowledge 
(theoretical and practical), principles, practices as well as the 
establishment of a research agenda regarding secure information systems 
development. The underlying aim of Secure Information Systems 
Engineering is to improve the quality of information systems by reducing 
the number of security vulnerabilities that these systems demonstrate.  
 
4.1 Characteristics 
According to Liles et al. (1995), every discipline demonstrates six 
characteristics: (1) a focus of study; (2) a world view; (3) a set of reference 
disciplines used to establish the discipline; (4) principles and practices 
associated with the discipline; (5) an active research or theory 
development agenda; (6) and the deployment of education and promotion 
of professionalism. 
 
4.1.1 A focus of study  
Every discipline aims to address a unique fundamental question or the 
focus of study. Such a question must have enough substance to evolve into 
a classical field of study (Liles, 1995) and be independent of technological 
changes (Keen, 1980).   
The fundamental question for secure information systems engineering can 
be formulated as “how to develop secure information systems?”. In 
answering such a question, many sub-questions need to be formulated and 
answered. For example, what we mean by “secure information systems?”, 
“what is good security?”, “how do we define security requirements?”. 
Usually, different researchers and practitioners will answer differently 
such questions. However, it is imperative that common answers are 
established in such fundamental issues, in order to provide a well-founded 
base in which we will be able to base further research questions leading us 
closer to answer the fundamental question of the discipline.  
 
4.1.2 A world view (or paradigm)  
The way that the discipline views the world guides the development of 
the discipline through practice and research (Doheny, 1987). The 
viewpoint of a discipline needs to be complex and substantial enough to be 
divided into sub-disciplines or sub-fields (Keen, 1980).  
We envisage the maturity of secure information systems engineering in 
such a degree that information systems developers will be able to model, 
construct, test, deploy and maintain secure information systems through 
well defined and structured processes and with the aid of appropriate 
modelling languages. In such a vision, development is made even easier 
with the aid of computer-aided tools that enable to accurately track the 
security solution to the initial system requirements and therefore validate it 
against the security goals of the organisation where the system is 
deployed. 
Our vision is based on three main world view assumptions for secure 
information systems engineering: (1) the development of secure 
information systems is a complex issue which involves technical as well 
as social challenges; (2) Processes, models, methodologies and automated 
tools can be employed to address the technical challenges and to assist in 
the development of secure information systems; (3) Proper education of 
anyone involved in the development as well as in the usage of information 
systems is needed to support the outputs of research addressing the 
technical challenges and to compliment the social challenges. 
The secure information systems engineering discipline can be divided 
into sub-disciplines such as security requirements engineering security 
modelling, secure information systems development, security policies / 
models / ontology and secure information systems engineering education.  
 
4.1.3 A set of reference disciplines used to establish the discipline  
Throughout history, new disciplines have emerged from the need to solve 
new problems that are not fully addressed by existing disciplines (Liles, 
1995). For example, in previous section we have discussed a list of 
problems of existing research and practice which motivate the 
establishment of secure information systems engineering, and we have 
explained the reasons why existing disciplines such as information 
systems and security engineering have failed to fully address these 
problems. 
However, disciplines do not exist in isolation but they are related to 
reference disciplines. Reference disciplines are existing bodies of 
knowledge that help establish the new discipline. Formally referencing 
disciplines recognizes the contributions of existing knowledge and 
provides a logical link to the new discipline. Without this linkage, 
researchers in existing disciplines may question the grounding theories of 
a new discipline and dismiss its importance (Liles, 1995).  
Secure information systems engineering builds upon the knowledge, 
theories and methods of several existing disciplines including information 
systems engineering, security engineering, and social sciences. The 
development of such techniques should be based on research provided by 
the security engineering research community, such as attack testing, 
secure design principles and security ontologies, complimented by 
research provided by the information systems engineering community, 
such as requirements engineering techniques, information systems 
development methodologies and modelling languages, and testing. 
Moreover, theories coming from social sciences should also be taken into 
account to ensure that the human factor is appropriately considered. 
 
4.1.4 Principles and practices associated with the discipline 
Principles incorporate the world view and define the philosophical 
approach to solving problems. Practices are the methodologies, models, 
procedures, and theories used to apply the discipline’s knowledge base. 
Together, principles and practices form the foundation of a discipline and 
promote further ordered study. In an engineering discipline, the body of 
abstract knowledge is developed by logical analysis and scientific 
research. The principles and practices of engineering are embodied in 
systems of theory, abstraction, design, and implementation. It is the 
activities which occur inside these systems that differentiates the many 
engineering disciplines (Liles, 1995). 
The proposed discipline has two main objectives: (1) the production of 
novel techniques, methods, processes and tools which will integrate 
security and information systems engineering principles; and (2) the 
education of information systems developers to use such techniques to 
analyse, design, implement, test and deploy secure information systems.  
We argue that an engineering discipline for secure information systems 
should be based on the following principles: consider security from the 
early stages of the information system development; separation of 
concepts; ensure quality of security solution; consistency. 
Although some of the above principles are not novel, and they are based 
on related information systems and/or security engineering principles, the 
point is that current approaches do not follow them. 
 
4.1.5 An active research agenda  
An active research agenda implies that hypotheses are being generated 
which address the fundamental question of the discipline. The agenda 
stands the test of time, with many researchers and practitioners in the 
discipline continually expanding the research that builds upon itself (Liles, 
1995). We believe that the research agenda for secure information systems 
engineering should include the following challenge: 
  
Challenge 1: Unify efforts to integrate security and information systems 
engineering.  
Although the need for such unification has been recognised by various 
researchers, work on integrating security and information systems 
engineering is mainly carried out independently either by members of the 
security research community or by members of the information systems 
engineering community. It is important to unify the efforts on the two 
fields. Only then we will be able to precisely identify the technical as well 
as the social issues that surround the development of secure information 
systems and produce solutions that truly work.  
Challenge 2: Consider the social dimension of security.  
Security is mainly considered as a technical issue by information systems 
and security engineers alike. A mature solution that integrates security and 
information systems engineering should consider not only the technical 
dimension of security but also the social dimension. It is only when we 
consider both dimensions that we will be able to develop secure enough 
information systems.  
Challenge 3: Develop complete security ontology. 
The need for sound and complete security ontology is well recognized as 
an important issue for the development of widely accepted solutions on 
secure information systems engineering. Such ontology will provide a firm 
and well-understood foundation to support the development of appropriate 
methods, processes and methodologies.      
At present, work on defining such ontology is carried out independently 
by the information systems engineering and security engineering research 
communities. This separation of work has resulted in an abstraction gap, 
which makes the integration and practical application of security issues on 
information systems engineering practices difficult.  As an example, 
consider the term “security requirement”. Although this term is 
fundamental; so far, it is used and interpreted differently by various 
researchers and practitioners. 
Challenge 4: Define a suitable exemplar. 
Typically, in information systems engineering, various approaches will be 
demonstrated using case studies which are tailored to emphasise the key 
characteristics of the approach. However, such case studies often focus on 
specific problems. It is important, therefore, to define a suitable example 
problem (in information systems engineering community the term 
exemplar is widely used when referring to an example problem) which 
will emphasize the problems faced by the community and it will serve as a 
focal point for discussion and exchange of research ideas and results. In 
choosing such an exemplar various criteria should be considered. For 
instance, the exemplar should be broad enough to cover all the possible 
issues, technical or social, which are associated with the development of 
secure information systems. Moreover, it should be generic enough as well 
as rich and complex enough to test the limits of any proposed approach. 
Challenge 5: Evaluate the different information systems engineering 
paradigms with respect to their appropriateness to integrate security 
Various information systems engineering paradigms exist such as model-
driven, aspect-oriented, and agent-oriented. All these treat information 
system development differently, using their own set of concepts and 
techniques. It is very important to identify the strengths and weaknesses of 
each of these paradigms when integrating security into the development 
process.    
Challenge 6: Development of new techniques, methods, processes that 
consider security as part of the information system development lifecycle.  
At present, most existing methodologies and models concentrate only on 
specific stages of the development process, such as security requirements 
engineering, or security design. It is vital, however, that security is 
considered throughout the development process and it is considered 
alongside the functional requirements and other non-functional 
requirements of the system-to-be. It is only then that we can consider 
security as part of the development process and not an isolated concept of 
the system. Therefore, it is important to develop new methods and 
techniques. These should support the formal (and simultaneous) 
modelling, reasoning and analysis of security and functional requirements, 
and the transformation of such (security and functional) requirements to a 
design that will satisfies them. Moreover, one of the main problems of 
considering security during the development stages of an information 
system is the lack of methods and techniques to trace the provided 
functionality to security requirements and also test the solution before the 
implementation of the system. Therefore, it is crucial to develop new 
methods and techniques to support traceability and validation of the 
proposed solution.  
Challenge 7: Tool support.  
Integrating security in the development process means adding extra 
activities in an already difficult task. Therefore, it is of paramount 
importance to produce tools to support the development process. A tool 
should not only support developers in modelling and reasoning about 
security (and functional requirements) during the analysis stage, but it 
should help to transform the requirements to design, check the consistency 
of the proposed solution and also validate the security functionalities of 
the proposed solution against the security requirements of the system.  
Challenge 8: Transfer of security knowledge.  
Many system developers do not always have a strong background in 
computer security and lack expertise in secure information system 
development. Nevertheless, in practice, they are asked to develop 
information systems that require security features. Secure information 
systems engineering methodologies should consider that issue and provide 
methods and processes that allow even developers with minimum security 
expertise to analyse and design a system with security in mind. At present, 
security patterns seem to provide a right step into this direction, as also 
argued in some of the chapters of this book. However, there is a need to 
enhanced current pattern languages and provide a better integration with 
information systems engineering processes and methods.   
Challenge 9: Transit research results to mainstream system development.  
An important, long-term, challenge is the successful transfer of research 
knowledge and best practice on developing secure information systems to 
industry. To achieve this, there is a need to make secure information 
systems engineering practice widely known (research and industry), 
standardize them and provide an agreed set of techniques, models and 
methodologies. This will ensure trust in the proposed methods and 
industrial confidence. 
 
4.1.6 Education and Professionalism 
Education and professionalism are essential to the widespread recognition 
and deployment of a discipline. A discipline should be identifiable with a 
research community that sustains its own literature. The written record of 
knowledge and thought progression is valuable for future researchers and 
practitioners to reference when developing new theories and 
methodologies. Conferences and journals provide a forum for researchers 
and practitioners to exchange ideas, develop new knowledge and identify 
future lines of research. Separate curricula, professional societies, and 
journals advance professionalism and are necessary for a separate 
discipline (Maynard, 1971). Although some research events, such as 
SREIS (www.sreis.org) and ISSSE (www.jmu.edu/iiia/issse) have been 
successfully organised the last few years; there is a need to organise large 
scale events that will involve not only researchers from all the related 
research communities but also industrialists. There is also need to 
encourage a curriculum which incorporates the different aspects coming 
from the various interdisciplinary subjects in order to provide the required 
knowledge. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper argues about the need to form a discipline to promote secure 
information systems development. Such effort should bring together 
experience and techniques from information systems engineering, security 
engineering and social studies disciplines in a coherent and organised way.  
An attempt to define the aims, objectives, practices and the challenges of 
the proposed discipline is taking place. However, this is not an absolute 
attempt and the paper aims to motivate a large scale effort towards the 
development of the discipline, which will hopefully result into a more 
complete and detailed definition of the proposed discipline.    
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